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ABSTRACT 
Nexus between income inequality and technology capture is explored in a global CGE model to 
explore the ricochet effect of technology transmission and its capture. In particular, the model 
shows that exogenous technology shock from developed North, vehicled via trade, transmits to 
developing Souths and induces productivity growth. This spillover capture, aided by human capital 
based adoptive capability, better governance and institution, causes increase in income and welfare 
and subsequently, leads to decline in income inequality. Dynamism of Southern Engines of 
Growth—India and China— caused them to emerge as ‗core‘ South. Thus, triangular innovation 
diffusion between dynamic and peripheral South is also simulated to show how the backward or 
peripheral South could catch up via South-South Cooperation in a declining North-South trends in 
trade. This accrual of benefits could lead to sustained productivity growth and consequential relief 
of incidence of poverty in low-income countries. 
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―The emphasis on human capital, especially the development of skill and productive ability spread 
across the population, contributes to shifting the focus of analysis from a "hard" view of 
development to a more" people-friendly" approach. ..[the] process of development is not separable 
from the expansion of human capabilities for its intrinsic as well as instrumental importance .‖ 
—Amartya K. Sen, in Development Thinking at the beginning of the 21st Century, pp. 20-22: 
1997.
1
 
“Innovation depends significantly on overall conditions in the economy, governance, education, 
and infrastructure. Such framework conditions are particularly problematic in developing 
countries, but experience shows not only that proactive innovation policies are possible and 
effective but also that they help create an environment for broader reforms." 
--World Bank, p.2: 2010.  
1. A Brief Overview:  
 
The relationship between long-term sustained productivity growth and egalitarian distribution 
is contingent, inter alia, on human capital formation, structural reforms, and trade reforms in 
conjunction with sound macroeconomic policies. Quite pertinently, it has been remarked: ‗trade 
liberalization ought to be simple choice for poverty-fighting politicians‘, but we need ‗in economic 
terms, the technological prowess, intellectual firepower, and rapid rates of economic growth‘ for 
poverty alleviation (The Economist, December 18, 2004). For the ‗infant‘ economies, the role of 
knowledge-capital and its propagation is important for reducing poverty and income inequality. 
Kosempel (2007) has shown that persistent disparities in income levels across nations could be 
attributed to the knowledge deficiencies and inability to learn the foreign technologies. Trade is an 
important conduit for North-South technology diffusion (Keller 2004, Coe and Helpman 1995, Bayoumi 
et al. 1999, Lucas 2009a). In this context, the dynamism of information and communication technology 
(ICT) is significant for facilitating diffusion. As global technological system is undergoing rapid 
transformation and innovation is at the core of economic progress of developing world, an ‗organic and 
evolutionary perspective‘ beyond traditional policy focus is necessary (World Bank 2010).
2
  
For economic growth to be pro-poor, it is imperative that the poor should have access to 
cutting-edge technologies, better socio-institutional set up and appropriate macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Thus, local conditions matter for turning the trade opportunities into growth effects. In 
this context, we emphasize the role of socio-institutional factors: human capital based absorptive 
capacity, governance, R&D and social acceptance parameters. Especially Goals 2 and 8 of MDG 
targets emphasize the predominant roles of access to new technologies via global partnership (i.e., 
educative effect of trade), universal primary education, boosting ICT investment, technology 
transmission, promoting e-Government, and good business environment, etc.
3
  In fact, lack of capacity 
                                                 
1
 Suntory and Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD). London School of 
Economics and Political Science. Discussion Paper No: DEDPS/2, March 1997. 
2
 Following this report, we adopt the definition of innovation as technology or practices new to an economy, but not in 
absolute sense.  
3 Goals 8A and 8F emphasize good governance, poverty reduction and technological access via global partnership (p. vii).  
Large disparities exist in use of ICT and diffusion of climate mitigation technologies (pp. 72-77, United Nations 2010.).  
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to absorb and innovate has been syndromes adversely affecting Africa‘s growth performances 
(Onyeiwu, March 2011). On the same token, empowering people by education facilitates human 
development. On the aspect of diffusion and social acceptance of novel technologies, governance and 
socio-institutional features make the climate favorable. Often, bad governance leads to flagrancy and 
misuse of resources. For example, in the context of Latin America, most of the countries except Chile 
have not been so successful in reducing poverty primarily because of corrupt political system siphoning 
off resources, lack of quality education, infrastructure, and governance.
4
 As pointed out by Sachs et al. 
(2004), in the context of tropical Sub-Saharan Africa, achieving poverty reduction entails removing 
these obstacles.  
As Meier and Stiglitz (p.5, 2002) put it, 'the preconditions [of absorptive capacity] must be in 
place for the acceptance and implementation of ideas.' Also, for the emerging Southern engines (e.g., 
especially India and China) better technological capability and skill has led to splitting the value-chain 
into separate 'production blocks' and trade in intermediates. As technological change affects it, it is 
important to have a cursory look at the extent of 'fragmentation' of production process.  
In this multipolar world, there is still a gap in understanding how North-South and South-South 
learning and knowledge exchange (i.e., triangular diffusion) works to reduce the income gap. This paper 
spells out a mechanism whereby closing the technological gap could reduce poverty via synergies and 
complementarities between North-South and South-South spillover and its capture. In particular, we 
show that given the initial income distribution, with proper constellation of socio-institutional factors, 
innovative and absorptive capacity (AC), the scope of trade-mediated innovation dissemination 
facilitates reduction of initial income inequality.
5
 A reduced-dimension version of a global Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model Global trade analysis project (GTAP) (Hertel ed. 1997), with 78 
regions  57 sectors, is spelt out and tailored in Section 3 for studying the multi-sectoral, multi-regional 
linkages. Section 2 reviews the literature and presents stylized evidences. Section 4 documents the 
implementation methodology. Section 5 analyzes the results. Section 6 summarizes. 
2. Trade, Technology and Inequality: A Bird’s Eye (Re-) view 
 Over several decades, researchers have contributed to offer insights about proximate 
determinants of within-country and cross-country differences in productivity (TFP) and income levels. 
Emphasis varied across wide range of factors such as, technology, human capital, as well as culture, 
climate, institutions, and geography (Acemoglu and Dell 2010). Of late, an ambitious sets of new 
‗Kaldor‘-style stylized facts presented by Jones and Romer (2010) offered the interactions between 
increased market integration and four state variables, namely: ideas, human capital, population and 
                                                 
4 International Herald Tribune, 26 May 2005, p. 6 
5 According to Lucas (2009, p.1), ‗flow of ideas is the main force for the reduction of income inequality, and for the 
convergence of incomes to a common, growing level.‘ 
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institutions that play role in explaining wide cross-country variation in growth rates and TFP, and their 
‗distance from the technology frontier‘.
6
  The most important among these facts are globalization‘s 
pervasive impact, large income (and growth) differences, flows of goods and technology, rise in human 
capital, and stable relative wages across skill categories (p. 225). Hsieh and Klenow (2010) has also 
shown the importance of education, technology, and institutions for explanations of income differences. 
Quoting Lucas (2009a, p.1): ―a study of economic growth in the world as a whole must be a study of the 
diffusion of the industrial revolution across economies, a study of the cross-country flows of 
production-related knowledge from the successful economies to the unsuccessful ones.‖ 
 Since our interest is to explore the role of trade (and other behind-the-border factors) in 
reducing inequality, we explore trade in technology-based sectors based on comprehensive data in 
GTAP Version 6 time-series trade data for the period 1965-2004. Share of high-technology exports in 
manufacturing exports are higher for advanced and semi-industrialized nations (Das 2002&2008). 
Based on technology content of different sectors, we consider broadly defined sectors with common 
characteristics and technology-intensivity of clusters.
7
 These broad clusters include light manufactures, 
heavy manufactures, and hi-tech products (Table 1).
8
  
Table 1: Average annual growth rates for global trade in technology clusters, 1965-2004 
Technology Clusters Average Annual Growth Rates (%) 
Information and communication technology 12 
Consumer goods 9.1 
Biotechnology Cluster 6.1 
Nanotechnology Cluster 10.4 
Transport Equipment 11.2 
Fabrication 9.1 
Source: Author‘s Calculations based on time-series trade data from the GTAP database Version 6.  
 
From the table, it is evident that global trade in technology-intensive products registered considerable 
growth and hi-technology sector registered the highest growth rate. Also, localisation of foreign 
technology depends on indigenous invention potential and own R&D-effort for building technology 
infrastructure. Technology achievement differs across nations because of uneven diffusion, inequalities 
in access to innovation, as well as in education and skills. According to UN Human Development 
Report (2001, p.2), ―the 20
th
 Century‘s unprecedented gains in advancing human development and 
eradicating poverty came largely from technological breakthroughs.‖ Following the report, we use 
Technology achievement Index (TAI) (Table 2) of each region and compare between source and the 
host nations to derive a bilateral technological congruence (TC) parameter (see next section).  This 
index, focusing on achievements in creation, diffusion, and development of human capability, is a broad 
measure of technology capability and captures disparities in human development. 
                                                 
6 This paper offers insights about the relationship between technology and nurturing human capability (p.6).   
7
 According to OECD (2000), technology is broadly defined as direct and indirect R&D embodiment of various types of 
intermediate inputs and capital goods. 
8
 Average annual growth rates are calculated using Ordinary Least Squares method.  
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From the Table, it is evident that the index values are much higher for developed regions like USA, 
Canada, Japan and EU. For the developing regions, we see relatively higher values for ‗dynamic 
adopters‘ in East and South Asia and some bloc of South American countries.
 9
 However, for some high 
performing economies, the values of such index are relatively low compared to industrialized nations. 
This is because in those countries there are within-country differences with enclave-led growth.
10
   
 ICT-related activities has generated spillover effects in the form of outsourcing of materials 
and services and splintering of industrial activity (Gordon and Gupta, 2004).
11
 In this context, we 
consider realignment of production and increasing tradability of services due to innovations that has led 
to expanding global trade in intermediates and outsourcing, especially in China and India-both 
diversifying, upscaling its production and exports (Santos-Paulion 2010b). There has been substantial 
production fragmentation via FDI undertaken by U.S. and Japanese IT firms, supporting that technology 
diffusion causes offshore outsourcing (Bonham and Gangnes 2004).  
 For a given final goods sector j in a region r, we define OS_SM (j, r) as the quantitative 
measure of service and material outsourcing intensity—based on Amiti and Wei (2004)—as a share of 
                                                 
9
 According to Human Development Report (p. 47, 2001), Technological Achievement is important for human 
development and the Index correlates with the Human Development Index. 
10
 For example, in case of India, Bangalore is technological hub, the centre of outsourcing activities and software 
technology development, but this is not spread in other regions uniformly because of low adult literacy rate, low tertiary 
enrolment rate and uneven diffusion of technology. Thus, although a state like Bangalore has high achievement index 
India's overall index is not that high, but India is ahead of others in IT area. 
11
 IT products include SITC (revision 2 and 3) classification categories 75, 76 and 776. These are automatic data 
processing instruments such as computers, calculators, photocopy machines, etc. and also, electronic components 
including semiconductors, electronic tubes and valves, telecommunications and radio equipment.    
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total inputs. We calculate extent of outsourced material or services for an industry j, OS_SM (j, r) 
according to the formula below:  
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a
a
[ ] [ ]                         (1) 
where for any region 'r',  
aijr: use of intermediate input 'i' in final user sector 'j',  
ajr: total all intermediate inputs (summed across all 'i') used for production in sector 'j',  
Gir: government consumption of import of traded commodity 'i', 
Pir: private household's consumption of import 'i', 
air: for each i
th
 intermediate input, total intermediate use of ‗i‘ by all user sectors 'j' (summed across 'j'), 
Yir: production/output of i
th
 traded commodity,  
Mir: imports of i
th
 traded commodity, and 
Xir: exports of i from r. 
 The first bracketed term, share of ith intermediate input in overall intermediate input usage for 
an industry j, gives intermediate input intensity for industry of use ‗j‘. Without having information for 
imports of each input by each industry from source region to destination regions, the second term is 
used to calculate the import share by usage, which is applied to each i
th
 industry.
12
 These two terms 
together give outsourcing intensity of material/services ‗i‘ for a typical industry of use ‗j‘ in a region ‗r‘. 
By aggregating over all the intermediate inputs (i.e., summing across all i‘s) used in a particular final 
goods sector ‗j‘, we derive the average outsourcing intensity ratio for each j
th
 sector of use, for five 
broad categories of manufactures: light and heavy manufactures, hi-technology intensive products, 
textile and clothing, capital goods and also for one service industry composite (Table 2).  
 
The calculations show that the developed and emerging economies of Asia are the recipients of 
outsourcing. Dividing the world economy into four-speed world (poor, struggling, affluent, and 
converging), OECD (2010) has shown that the economic centre of gravity has shifted to these emerging 
                                                 
12
 In Amiti and Wei (2004), a pro-rata assumption is made and economy-wide import share is applied for computing such 
import share. Since in the GTAP database, we have data on foreign and intermediate inputs used in sectors of usage, this 
ad hoc assumption is not applied. Thus, ours specification and calculation supposedly contains more accurate data. 
 7 
economies. More and more developing economies are engaged in innovative partnerships in areas of 
mutual learning and knowledge for facing development challenges. This realignment of regional growth 
has altered the macroeconomic context and development policy must take into account such shift of the 
global economic heft. Fragmentation of production process has enabled division of production networks 
according to comparative advantage and led to the emergence of China and India as the centers of such 
activities. In fact, service sector‘s share being largest (54%), ―India‘s experience proffers an 
unparalleled paradigm of the role of technological progress, and the transmission channels through 
which macroeconomic fundamentals can explain [her] success‖  (Santos-Paulino and Wan p. 264, 
2010b). In case of China, such shifts have been induced via ‗informatization‘ and radical gradualism to 
service sector following Indian experience (World Bank 2007a&b). During 2000s, they have grown 
about 3 to 4 times the OECD average while some developing nations in Africa and Latin America 
underperformed (OECD 2010). China and India has done rapid intensification of R&D spending as 
percent of GDP (about 1.7-2%). Both of these nations‘ stellar performance in technology, innovation, 
advanced labor force, domestic factors, and trade highlights the opportunities of positive spillovers for 
others and thus, challenge the conventional wisdom focusing on advanced economies as tour-de-force.  
In fact, IMF (January 2011) has offered insightful evidences on profound impact of Brazil-Russia-India-
China (BRIC) on the low-income countries (LICs) via international economic ties or, South-South trade 
(19% of global trade).  In particular, the report finds substantial support for growth spillovers via closer 
BRIC (particularly India and China) -LIC ties encompassing mostly trade, financing, FDI, technology 
for overcoming infrastructural bottlenecks, improving productivity, and sustained growth (p.p. 28-30).
13
 
Comprising more than 40% of the global population, trajectories of GDP growth rate in theirs has 
established themselves as Southern giants (that is, China and India being the first two in the Southern 
bloc). 
 According to Bonham and Gangnes (2004), East Asia‘s share of global IT production has 
grown to 26% compared to 5% twenty years ago, almost at par with the US at 28%, establishing herself 
as leading exporter of such products. For the Newly Industrialized Economies, the compound annual 
growth rate of IT production during 1985-2000 was almost 14% whereas for Japan it is 6%. In case of 
East Asia, sustained economic growth has led to reduction of poverty in this highly dynamic developing 
region—number of people living below $2 a day have fallen to 34% from 50% at 1999 level (World 
Bank 2004). In that bloc, China has emerged as ‗a major hub for regional production and trade 
networks‘ (World Bank 2004a). The impact of India‘s growing exports of IT-related services has been 
enormous (Kobrin, 1999). According to the report, in this region, industrial production achieved 5-10% 
gains due primarily to India‘s export potential especially in hi-tech sectors and IT-related service 
activities. Pakistan and Sri Lanka did not perform as well like the Indian sub-continent. As opposed to 
                                                 
13 In post-crisis period, BRIC‘s contribution to LIC growth divergences has increased. Trade channel is the dominant 
with 60% of the impact transmission. 
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these regions, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh showed poor performances due to political instability, 
infrastructural deficiencies, and heightened external market competition. Having immense innovation 
potential, unleashing it via entrepreneurial competition, creating and diffusing innovation, and fostering 
inclusive innovation by promoting adaptive capacity and grassroots efforts could decline poverty 
(World Bank 2007a). According to OECD (2010), ―Software technology is gaining prominence in 
national strategies for the development of information and communication technology. There has been a 
surge in regional and bilateral co-operation in software development in recent years, especially in e-
governance and e-learning. Most technical capacity, however, remains concentrated in China, India and 
a few South-East Asian countries.‖ As India and China have increasingly participated in global trade by 
technical upgrading, product diversification and expanding trade capabilities, their roles in boosting 
long run economic growth of the LICs in post-crisis period is substantial. According to Santos-Paulino 
and Wan (p.2, 2010a), ‗rapid growth in China and India is a key driver behind the expected convergence 
of per capita incomes at the national level and internationally.‘  Under globalization, the prospect of 
forming Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in these regions calls for the analysis of a development strategy 
for technical and industrial cooperation between these countries. Based on this sui generis cases, India 
can be conceived as a ‘hub‘ region in South Asia which can potentially transfer benefits to neighboring 
nations serving as ‗spokes‘ to her; thus, in a Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) Hub-and-Spokes (HAS, 
heretofore) type of trade arrangements could potentially be a conduit for growth propagation in poor 
nations in South Asia. Analogously, China‘s meteoric rise has established herself as a hemispheric hub. 
Thus, South-South and triangular knowledge transfer could create an opportunity for learning 
partnership between the ‗new‘ growth-drivers and the relatively backward economies. Nonetheless, 
there are several preconditions--for example, structural and institutional reforms, infrastructure 
strengthening, foreign direct investment, improving governance, basic education, human capital, health, 
intellectual property rights, to name a few.  
Any service or material outsourcing by relocating least efficient parts of production to cheaper 
locations can have positive productivity benefits, in the sense that it can provide inputs to other user 
firms at lower prices and results in fall in final goods prices.
 14
  Without any human capital augmentation 
and technological spillover for long–run growth, it leads to welfare loss as displaced workers in 
developing nations consume less, and face decline in standard of living than before. This creates 
incidence of poverty. For formulating an effective development strategy, the triads of growth, inequality 
and poverty are all important (Bourguignon 2004). According to World Development Report (2005), 
lower diffusion barriers, organizational innovation, and better investment climate in China helped to 
bring 400 million people out of poverty net. Many researchers have highlighted the nexus between 
trade, growth and poverty (Berg and Krueger 2003; Dollar and Kraay 2002; World Bank‘s Development 
                                                 
14
 Amiti and Wei (2004, pp. 36-58) in IMF working paper & in Finance and Development, IMF (pp. 38-39). Scope for 
India, China and its trading partners to benefit from fragmentation is enormous via sophisticated high tech products. 
 9 
Policy Group's Global Economic Prospects 2004a; World Development Report, various issues; 
Robinson and Lofgren 2005, Winters et al. 2004). There are empirical evidences that trade helps nations 
to embark on a higher growth path (Frankel and Romer 1999; Helpman 2004, Lucas 2009a). However, 
given the income distribution, growth is beneficial for reduction of income poverty; but if growth leads 
to a worsening of the distribution, then poverty accentuates (Deininger and Squire 1996). According to 
Ravallion (1995, 2001, 2004), sensitivity of poverty to economic growth depends on initial income 
inequalities.  
Gini Coefficient is the most widely used aggregate measure of income inequality with salient 
characteristics.
15
 Although it captures overall income distribution aspect, it reflects the extent of poverty 
in a nation. According to Sen (1973), his poverty index is "essentially a translation of the Gini 
coefficient from the measurement of inequality to that of poverty." Ravallion (1994) also finds that 
rankings of inequality and poverty indices are similar and they move in unison with each other. By 
drawing on a relationship of poverty-growth-inequality triangle, Bourguignon (2003) showed that 
changes in income distribution could be attributed to growth effect (given unchanged relative income 
distribution) and distributional effect (given unchanged mean income). It can be envisaged that if an 
economy has egalitarian distribution then the fruits of economic growth, whatever be the source, 
permeates through social osmosis into the overall fabric of the society if it is targeted well by public 
policy. On the contrary, if a society has inegalitarian income distribution, there will be imperfection in 
absorbing the fruits of economic growth as every dollar generated due to growth bypasses the poor 
segment of the society. Yitzhaki (2002) decomposed inequality index into components reflective of 
extent of inequality among poor and rich classes so that it provides, like poverty indices, necessary 
information about within and between-groups inequality. In this work, within each cohort, 'skilled' are 
assumed to be 'non-poor' or relatively affluent whereas the 'unskilled' are assumed to be 'poor' or 
relatively less affluent. Within these cohorts, there are substantial income differences that are reflected 
in national Gini measures.
 
Computed Gini across skill-unskill labor categories for the GTAP non-
composite regions show that across almost all regions, compared to Gini index for skilled labor force, 
the Gini coefficient is lower for the unskilled.
 16
 This implies that within-group income inequality is 
                                                 
15 Poverty gap (PG) is ‗the mean shortfall from the poverty line expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This 
measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence (World Bank 2008, p.348)‘.  We adopt the standard 
definition of Gini following World Bank (1998/99, p. 236), ―Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of 
income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. ... [A] Gini 
index of zero would represent perfect equality and an index of 100 would imply perfect inequality.‖ However, as this 
paper does neither develop a new measure of Gini index and Poverty, nor does it offer a critique of such family of 
measures in the literature, for parsimony, I do not elaborate on various aspects (see Sen 1973 and 1995).    
16
 See Das (2008) for the computed indices, which are not reported for space limitations. Alternatively, for computing the 
Ginis, we have also taken percentage of people below national poverty line and 50% of median income for developed 
nations as proxy of proportion of people below poverty line. This measure is not accurate. However, because GTAP 
database has skilled income payment share we adopt tertiary education enrolment level as proxy of skilled. 
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higher for skilled.
 17
 As such, there are considerable heterogeneities across these two groups and so, we 
could expect considerable heterogeneity in the impacts of trade on inequality and poverty (Ravallion 
2004).
18
 Compared to the case of initial high-income inequality for relatively equal income distribution 
(i.e., relatively lower Gini for unskilled), economic growth has larger effect on poverty alleviation. 
 Technology can ameliorate the problems of bad governance, economic distance factors, 
productivity and enable a nation to move ahead. This depends also in ‗scaling up’ of the successes so 
that it reaches the relatively less skilled segments, and thus can have a dampening effect on inequality. 
According to Dyke (2001), ―Poverty can be eliminated within the next 50 years if a broad range of 
technology—not only information technology—is used as a tool to spark and enhance a comprehensive 
development strategy that encompasses economic, political, social, and environmental elements. 
Technology is not a solution in itself, but it has enormous potential to speed poverty reduction (p. 17).‖  
 However, according to Sen (p.9, 1995) ―the theory of inequality evaluation has close links with 
that of assessment of poverty, and the choice of space becomes a central concern… If poverty is seen as 
the deprivation of some minimum fulfillment of elementary capabilities, it becomes easier to understand 
why poverty has both an absolute and a relative aspect. These considerations are important in dealing 
with poverty in any country (rich or poor). Thus, Sen (1995) calls for an ‗explicit consideration of the 
relation between deprivations in‘ income and the capability to enjoy the fruits of economic growth.  As 
argued by Sen (1993, 2004), combination of failure of entitlements (i.e., lack of resources) and 
capability failure (i.e., inability to transform commodity characteristics into useful functioning) leads to 
poverty. In this paper, we adopt this broader connotation of poverty— economic ‗unfreedom‘ (Sen 
1998). The empowerment via investing in technology and socio-institutional fundamentals confers 
freedom as a means to the end of emancipating people from economic unfreedom or poverty. Access to 
knowledge-capital broadens the initial entitlements conducive for growth, whereas the important 
functioning of being able to reduce incidence of poverty depend on the TAP parameters for knowledge-
absorption. These factors expand the 'capabilities' and convert 'expanded set of entitlements' or access to 
technological improvement to well-defined action by dint of enhanced productivity. However, even 
with accessibility to foreign technology without ‗right‘ combination of AC, SC, GP and TC parameters 
there is scope of capability failure, which might translate into failure of achievement of important 
functioning resulting in increase in poverty gap.
19
 In other words, the essential idea here is not, as such, 
                                                 
17
 According to Yitzhaki (2002), it is an increasing function of poverty line. If the cutoff poverty line is below the overall 
mean income then, between -group inequality will rise with the poverty line because then, proportion of people living 
below poverty line will have income lower than mean income of the whole group. Thus, those who are above poverty line 
will have higher average income, much higher than the cutoff line of poverty.  
18
 The Gini values across skill categories are discussed in detail in other paper (Das 2008). As this article has a different 
focus, we do not report it here for space constraints.  
19 Given the primary emphasis of the paper, viz., impact of innovation capture on inequality and subsequently on 
reduction of economic gap, it is to be noted that we consider here poverty gap (PG, see sections 3 and 4 below) and 
hence, we do not consider poverty and inequality synonymously. As has been mentioned by Deaton and Dreze (2002), 
inequality‘s reflection can be found in poverty measurement and PG can give equally good measure like head-count ratio. 
 11 
about the role of income transfer, per se, between wealthy and non-wealthy; rather, it focuses on the role 
of socio-economic factors and institutional arrangements in developing capabilities so as to achieve 
arrays of alternative functioning opportunities e.g., innovating efficiency by harnessing the fruits of 
technical progress.
20
  Technology or income gains, per se, might be necessary for expansion of 
opportunities and achieving technical efficiency; however, ‗freeing‘ up the constraints or limited capture 
via quality social arrangements and promulgating absorptive capacity is quasi-sufficient to proffer 
higher degrees of freedom to ward off deprivation—technological as well as human capital-wise—and 
hence, poverty. With knowledge-capital (either indigenous or acquired capabilities), the gap will shrink 
as the capability expansion will make the innovation system efficient with relatively better opportunity 
space. The recipient nations with favourable initial conditions (quality education, innovative capabilities 
and other socio-institutional factors) will be in a better position to accumulate capabilities for uptaking 
ideas and innovation, reducing morbidity, and achieving better human capital than the stagnating ones. 
However, degree of such innovation-diffusion and dampening of poverty gap is conditional on the 
virtuous circle of technology, poverty and inequality
21
 In fact, acknowledging country-specific 
idiosyncrasies, Fosu (January 2011) presents recent global evidences to show that although economic 
growth and income inequality both matter, initially favourable income distribution matters for growth to 
be effective in poverty reduction and thus, lends support to my thesis. 
3. Technology Spillover, Capture and Poverty Gap: Rationale and a Model  
3.1 Underlying Theoretical Premise 
In this paper, we construct an empirical general equilibrium model (a modified version of a 
global trade (CGE) model) to highlight the role of skill, governance, structural congruence between 
advanced source and relatively backward nations for assimilating the technology.  
According to the UN (2010, p. ix) MDG Gap Task Force Report, after the crisis as there are 
huge gaps in meeting the MDG 8 commitments, ‗improved access to new technologies has become 
increasingly pressing‘. Different factors affect the capacity to capture the benefits of technological 
innovation. Effective assimilation depends on the skill intensity of the labor force--i.e., absorption 
capacity (AC).  It depends on education and schooling years (Barro and Lee, 1996; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Nelson, 1990). Investment in human capital, for instance, can help developing 
technological capability. Although lack of formal education might not pose serious obstacles for 
                                                                                                                                                    
In case of India, the study finds that in 1990s an increase in inequality does not accompany unprecedented improvement 
in poverty gap with divergences in social progress parameters across regions. According to Sen (1995), income gap and 
head-count are inadequate measure of poverty as income transfer/gain does not give true picture of aggregate poverty as 
it ignores inequality in income distribution among the poor. In Sen‘s formulation (p. 104, ibid.), aggregate poverty 
measure is function of income gap, head-count as well as Gini coefficient of inequality. This justifies the rationale in this 
paper. 
20 For example, in case of green revolution, gene revolution, or any emerging technologies the capability to adopt and 
adjust (via public-private joint venture of R&D) leads to fall in micronutrient deficiencies of the laggard nations, 
improvement in their human capability via nourishment and better health, and productive efficiency gains. Thus, it ‗frees‘ 
the individuals from the lack of capability to use technology.  
21 Bussolo and O‘connor (2002) discussed this in the context of India, China as well as others for emerging technologies. 
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embracing ‗new‘ ideas, knowledge deficiency is surely a handicap, in general, for procurement, 
absorption, and effective dissemination of technology.
22
 Rather than standing on the shoulders of the 
giants, education or cognitive skills (in the broad sense) reinforce the other facets—like social learning, 
networking, institutions, and quality government—conducive for overcoming the backwardness. In a 
similar vein, it is pertinent to note that: ―the backwardness of individuals as economic agents is an 
unfortunate cause and result of poverty. Schooling and training are commonly advocated as means of 
raising creative capacity and inspiring achievement.‖ (Meier and Stiglitz, 2002, p.4).
 23
 In African 
growth context, Onyeiwu (p. 4, March 2011) presents both arguments—for and against—of developing 
AC and TAI. In particular, it has been shown that because of lack of adequate technological innovation 
and absorptive capacity the African firms produce low-end products and experience slow growth. Paus 
(2005) mentions that: ―the absolute number of skilled and educated workers in a developing country is 
one factor that ceteris paribus influences the amount of high-tech FDI a developing country can attract.‖ 
Chen (2008) has found that the primary motive of location of R&D centres in China has been the supply 
of ‗best talents.‘ Not only that, several recent research, viz., Lucas (2009a&b), Jones and Romer (2010), 
Hsieh and Klenow (2010), amongst others, have mentioned the importance of this linkage.  
 Technology and human development are intimately related via enhancement of human 
capabilities, reinforcing each other in a virtuous circle. Domestic invention and foreign-sourced 
technological spillovers depend, inter alia, on a country‘s institutional setting like political stability and 
good governance (Groot et al. 2004; De Ferranti, et al. 2003, Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 1997, 2008; 
Dasgupta 2009). Being familiar with another country‘s institutional factors like legal side protecting 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), habits and even languages that one geographically closer country 
becomes culturally congruent and socially cohesive. The role of governance and institutional quality 
along with education in appropriating the diffused spillovers can not be underestimated. In fact, 
broadening the connotation Dasgupta (p.3, 2009) argues that ―that a natural place to look for the worth 
of social capital in macroeconomic statistics is "total factor productivity" (TFP). But that implies that 
TFP is an amalgam of technology and institutions.‖ Typically, in countries with low income level and 
                                                 
22
 Recently, while explaining an ‗educational puzzle‘ in case of Germany, importance has been ascribed to ‗a 
combination of schooling and apprenticeship‘ as a ‗reliable supplier and shaper of the sort of labour German businesses 
need to make goods of high quality.‘ Moreover, it recognizes that ‗the best long-run predictor of a country‘s economic 
growth rate is the performance of its children in comparative tests in science, maths, and so forth (The Economist, p.64, 
February 2011). Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) has presented evidences supporting complementarity between 
cognitive skill as well as quantity and quality of schooling institutions are important for closing the economic gap. 
23 Absorptions of ‗ideas‘ or innovations (in Schumpeterian sense of entrepreneurship) require some basic level of 
education. In case of low-value added segments, like assembly jobs in a vertically integrated production structure, higher 
human capital content might not be essential as unskilled workers can perform the routine, mechanical job by sheer 
learning-by-doing. However, without a ‗basic‘ level of educational background via schooling, making effective use of 
even that knowledge imparted via on-the-job training and its successful implementation is quite difficult. In other words, 
a certain threshold level of formal education enables one to be receptive to new vintage technology in the first place and 
then, the higher is the extent of educational attainment via formal schooling, the higher is the scope for accessing 
sophisticated and scientific ideas embedded in technology and improving further (Lucas 2009a, Jones and Romer 2010). 
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higher extent of poverty, the issue of bad quality governance is important to consider. We incorporate 
the institutional factors via a parameter reflecting the index of governance (GP). Typically, it is argued 
that technology transmitted from the source will deliver the potential benefits to the recipients if the 
level of governance quality of origin vis-à-vis client is (almost) similar, if not identical. Also, better GP 
can enhance integration, facilitate trade flows, and makes it structurally homogeneous.  
Not only hindrance in acquisition of AC and TC, but also socio-cultural distance limits the 
extent of knowledge diffusion and widening of the existing technology frontier. For cultural affinity that 
determines the degree of social cohesion and acceptance of ‗new‘ technology in a region, it is assumed 
to depend on overall quality of human resource development. We incorporate such effect via 
exogenously specified ‗social acceptance (SA) parameter‘--a composite measure representing quality of 
life. This measure also captures the effect of human capital, via human resource development and 
improvement in living standard, on reduction in deprivation. Conjointly, source and destination-specific 
TC and GP determine the binary institutional-structural congruence index (SC) which together with the 
absorption capacity (AC) and social acceptance (SA) parameters determines the amalgam technology 
appropriation parameter (TAP)--encapsulating the role of SC, TC and AC in harnessing the benefits of 
technology transfer. The magnitude of such composite index confers some objective measure of 
proximity (unity identifying almost proximate regions, while zero indicating maximum incongruity). 
 State-of-the-art technologies of recent vintages, invented in the developed countries (DCs), are 
embodied in the commodities produced using the new ‗ideas.‘ The spillover to the destinations happens 
via bilateral trade linkages.
24
 Sustained growth and development depends on indigenous innovation 
potentials and on their capabilities to assimilate advanced technologies, and this is especially true for the 
low-income nations (Pack and Westphal 1986; World Bank 2007&2010; Das 2008). Current vintage 
technologies such as bio-nanotechnology and ICT require expertise for utilisation (Jones and Romer 
2010).
25
   
3.2 A Model 
 An exogenous technological improvement in unique sector of source induces spillover effects 
to all other sectors in the source and destinations via traded intermediates. This is facilitated by 
increasing fragmentation of production technology in separate production blocks involving trade in 
middle products enriched in technological contents (Jones 2000). Lucas (2009a&b) has formally 
modeled the role of knowledge (ideas), its ‗social and reciprocal‘ character and emphasized the 
importance of trade-led diffusion of ideas for endogenous technological progress and economic growth.  
                                                 
24  Thus, international trade in commodities facilitates propagation of superior ‗technologies‘ embodied in those traded 
goods and services (Eaton and Kortum, 1996; Keller, 1998, 2001, 2004; World Development Report, World Bank, 1999 
for empirical evidences).  
25 In this paper, we consider emerging technology like ICT as it is a general-purpose technology (GPT) with 
pervasiveness. The ability to use such modern technology requires a threshold level of skill even for basic functioning. 
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As specified in equation (2), trade-induced knowledge spillover to a particular sector in the client 
regions depends on input-specific trade intensity via fragmented technology.  Unlike several studies 
offering aggregated mechanism for say, FDI and factor market effects and skill formation, ours offer an 
aggregative mechanism for technology capture (via factors determining macroeconomic channel) while 
technology transmission is modeled via micro-transmission mechanism underlying sectoral productivity 
spillovers.
 26
 Hence the embodiment index is defined in terms of trade intensities for different specific 
material inputs--Eijrs--as the flow of imported intermediate produced in sector ‗i‘ in source region ‗r‘ 
that is exported to firms in sector ‗j‘ in recipient region‗s‘ [Firjs] per unit of composite intermediates 
used by sector ‗j‘ in ‗s‘ [Mijs].  Thus,  
                             Eirjs = Firjs/Mijs                     (2)                     
where Firjs is the imports of ‗i‘ from source ‗r‘ used by sector ‗j‘ in recipient ‗s‘. Mijs is the value of 
purchases of traded intermediate i by firms in industry j of region r.  For governance parameter (GPrs), 
it is measured by the following function: 
   GPrs = min [1, GPs/GPr]     (3) 
According to (3), if destination‗s‘ has higher GPs than that of source ‗r‘ i.e., GPr, then it is conducive 
governance structure for‗s‘ to effectively utilize the transferred technology. Otherwise, a backward 
client region lags in institutional quality [i.e., GPs<GPr], and faces hindrance for absorbing the 
technology even with higher AC (0GP
rs
1). 
 Analogously, for technological congruence factor (TCrs), measuring proximity or closeness 
between the source and the client regions 'r' and 's', is defined as below:   
   TCrs = min [1, TCs/TCr]     (4) 
Here, TCrs  [0, 1] with zero, representing distancing away from the invention frontier of the inventor 
and unity implying otherwise. For Social acceptance (SAs) indexes, it is given by:  
                            SAs = min[1 ],
s
threshold
SA
SA
                 (5) 
This implies that a larger magnitude of social acceptance (via human development) than the 
threshold level is conducive for AC. It binds the value within unit interval and captures the notion that, 
depending upon technology, up to a certain limit the low level of human development obstacles 
                                                 
26 The model developed here considers the spillover mechanism at the sectoral level emphasizing micro-level 
mechanisms via trade in intermediates and its impact on productivity. However, the capture parameters like AC, TAI, 
TC, and GP are done at the aggregate level because of paucity of data at the sectoral level for all global regions in a 
multi-regional world trade model. Parsimony of data in a multi-regional setup for all sectors limits our analysis in the 
current paper. Sector-specific absorption and other parameters could be considered for further extension. Given the 
current focus and primary emphasis, it does not undermine our purpose. In fact, Das (2010) has outlined such a micro-
transmission channel, which awaits implementation in a large-scale general equilibrium framework. I thank a referee for 
helpful feedback.     
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acceptance, but beyond the minimum level, it facilitates adoption. The threshold level of social 
acceptance proxied by human development index (HDI) measures standard of living and quality of life. 
This provides the basis for improvement in social status and poverty alleviation. 
The definition for the spillover coefficient is given by:  
                                       s
ijrssijrsijrs EE
  1,                                  (6) 
where ijrs is the spillover coefficient between ‗i‘ in source ‗r‘ and ‗j‘ in destination‗s‘ and s is ―capture 
parameter‖ ‗s‘. s is the product of the AC-index ACs (where 0ACs1) and the structural congruence 
index SCrs (where 0SCrs1); Thus, the efficiency with which the knowledge embodied in bilateral 
trade flows from source ‗r‘ is captured by the recipients ‗s‘ is contingent on:  
                          
s 
= AC
s
.SA
s
.SC
rs
                                                (7) 
whereas  
  SCrs = GPrs. TCrs     (8) 
The actual productivity level from the potential streams of ‗current vintage technology‘ depends on 

s
[0,1] with 
s
=1 implying full assimilation of technology.
27
 For destination region‗s‘, 
s
 and E
rs
 
jointly determine the value of the ‗Spillover Coefficient’
s
(E
rs
, 
s
) such that:  
          
s
(0) =0, 
s
(1) =1, s (1s) Ers

s >0, s  = s(1s)/Ers
1+s
 <0. 
where primes indicate the first () and the second () derivatives with respect to E
rs. 
More specifically, 
                       s1rssrss E,E

 , 10 s                       (9) 
  In the source region, the benefit of a technological change in a sector is reaped directly by the 
other sectors via the usage of locally produced intermediates embodying superior technology and 
indirectly via imported intermediates.  Exogenous TFP improvement in ‗r‘ has a domestic spillover 
effect in the receiving sectors via so that: 
                         Eijr = Dijr/Mjr            (ij)                                      (10) 
where Dijr is the quantity of domestic tradeable commodity 'i' used by firms in sector ‗j‘ of source ‗r‘ 
and Mjr is the domestic production of 'j' in ‗r‘. The spillover coefficient for source is: 
                                     rijrrijrijr EE
  1),(                                             (11) 
where r [0, 1] is the human capital and social acceptance based capture-parameter for source ‗r‘.    
                                                 
27 As mentioned before, Dasgupta (2009) and Kauffman (2004) provide overview of such indicators of socio-economic 
and political stability. In fact, corruption and bad governance create a pernicious cycle of syndromes inhibiting growth 
and social distrust causing the economic system to collapse under infernal regime. The composite capture-parameter 
encapsulates such factors. As we do not explicitly model these factors and the focus is more on assimilation aspect, we 
set aside detailed overview on such issues. 
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 Generically, TFP transmission equation can be written as: 
                                     ava(j, s) = s
ijrsE
1
.ava (i, r)                                    (12) 
where ava (i,r)  and ava (j,s) are respectively the percentage changes in TFP levels in source and 
destinations [ij are the innovating sector and the receiving sectors respectively, and rs]. In our 
model,, is the capture parameter composite of AC, SS, TC and GP [ (0, 1)].  
Following our discussion, spillover coefficient and technology appropriation parameter are 
crucially dependent on these structural factors. Starting with an existing level of income inequality, one 
can reduce inequality and hence, incidence of poverty provided some factors counter the inequality-
inducing effect of general-purpose technology like ICT. The factors that work against the inequality 
convergence effect are lack of human capital, bad governance, lack of innovation capability, and inept 
institutional structure. Fostering technology could induce structural change, impact on income 
inequality and lead to higher incidence of poverty with more unequal income distribution—the inequity 
in distribution even with higher average level of income sends more people in poverty.  
Unlike previous studies, we incorporate the aspect of geographical dispersion of productivity 
spillovers and its repercussions on poverty gap elimination. Poverty is a multidimensional concept and 
human development index (HDI) is a ‗conglomerative‘ index of relative human deprivation, as argued 
Anand and Sen (1997). In our formulation, we consider Human Development Index (HDI) as a proxy 
for social acceptance of foreign technology, embracing a wider perspective of poverty.
28
   However, we 
focus on the role of Capture-parameter as a facilitator in such mechanism. Higher capture implies higher 
spillover coefficient and hence, higher TFP and labor productivity. Thus, higher trade-mediated 
technology flows and induced-productivity escalation depend on higher values of spillover coefficient 
and  whereas -values depend on constellation of AC, SS, TC and GP. Higher  means lower Gini 
values and vice versa. Therefore, trade can facilitate inequality convergence if these factors are 
appropriately functioning so that with perfect capture [i.e.,  = 1], inequality is non-existent [G = 0] 
whereas with abysmally low knowledge harness [i.e.,  = 0], inequality is extremely high [G = 1], 
causing extreme poverty. In particular, we postulate an inverse logistic relationship
29
 between Ginitial  
[0, 1] and [0, 1] such that when  rises from 0 to 1, Ginitial falls from 1 to 0.  Therefore, we write, for 
any region 's', generically: 
                                                 
28
 Human Poverty Index is an alternate measure of income poverty and it is deprivational index (Anand and Sen 1997). It 
includes three components viz., survival deprivation, educational and knowledge deprivation, and economic deprivation.  
29 One could have an inverse linear specification where Gconvert = 1- F(Ginitial, ). However, this is not strong specification. 
Alternatively, another nonlinear specification is Cobb-Douglas: Gconvert = Ginitial 
[1-s(Ers, s)]
 where no spillover implying 

s
= 0 means Gconvert = 1 (that is, perfect inequality) and s = 1 implies Gconvert = Ginitial (that is, initial inequality prevails) 
without any magnification of inequality.    
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where  
g: average proportional rate of decrease of Gini coefficient due to growth in trade dependency ratio 
(trade as a percentage of GDP).  
 (s): regional spillover coefficient parameter. 
(s): poverty elasticity with respect to trade liberalization;  
Yinitial (s): initial poverty threshold income level, normalized to unity (benchmark) for each 's'.  
Given s (1s) Ers

s >0, we can use equation (11) to infer that 
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Thus, from a policy perspective, for a nation with an existing level of inequality or poverty, she 
could surpass the 'inequality trap' and achieve growth if there is appropriate constellation of factors like 
literacy, education, social capital, governance, democracy, economic freedom, infrastructure, etc. These 
factors determine the capture (). Thus, trade and technology can have dampening effect on Gini via 
growth, trade, technology nexus (Hertel and Reimer 2004, Dollar and Kraay 2002, Cline 2004, 
McCulloch, Winters, and Cirera 2001; Winters et al. 2004).  
Unlike prior research focusing only on the nexus between Gini coefficients and economic 
growth vis-à-vis trade, our study contributes by extending the extant research via incorporating the 
distributional impact of technology spillovers.  Following Bourguignon (2004), for small mean income 
changes and changes in distribution of relative income, change in poverty is a function of growth in 
mean income and change in relative income distribution. Poverty gap is another signaling indicator of 
income inequality gap.
30
 According to Chen and Ravallion (2004), 'poverty gap [measures] the mean 
distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. It reflects inequality among the poor 
(assuming that non-poor or rich has zero gaps). Thus, according to Bourguignon (2004), changes in 
growth and inequality in (relative) distribution generate changes in poverty depending on initial 
inequality. In our model, we postulate that the higher is the value of the technology appropriation 
parameter (contingent on the constellation of parameters for AC, GP, TC and SC), the higher will be the 
rate of appropriation of technology and hence, the higher will be labor productivity leading to lower 
inequality (i.e., lower Gini coefficient). The crucial role ascribed to technology appropriation parameter 
determines the effect on poverty gap and income distribution. The initial poverty gap in a region 'r', 
being dependent on technology capture, is reduced by the spillover; given transformed Gini indexes 
                                                 
30
 Chen and Ravallion (2004, World Bank Research Observer) defines Poverty Gap, PG = [1 – ratio of mean income of 
the poor to the poverty line] × Head count ratio.  
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(Gconvert), the higher is the absorption capability measured by capture parameter, the lower is the 
inequality gap. 
Let PGr: poverty gap in any region 'r'. 
Gconvert (r): transformed Gini values due to spillover effect (as before from equation 13). 
(r): mean absolute income of a nation 'r' as ratio of income to poverty line of $1.08 a day (see Chen 
and Ravallion 2004).To show the mechanism, for any r, we define:  
  PGr = Gconvert (r) - (r)  rln( )             (15) 
Thus, given Gconvert (r) and (r), 
r
r
r
r
(PG ) 
 

 

 ,  where ,   > 0. This means that for given 
income (r) when capture parameter augments the spillover, the poverty gap diminishes.       
However, for binary relation between two regions—source and destinations—'r' and 's', the Gap in Gini 
for any destination region 's' when 'r' is unique ('r' being unique source region) is,  
   PG (s) = Gconvert (r) -  (s)  
r
rs
ln( )                                  (16)  
Hence, using (14), given 0
convert
s
G (s)



  , we write also 0s
rs
(PG )




. 
On this basis, for all 'r' we implement a linear specification of (15) where capture parameter enters 
linearly in the equation such that
31
  
    PG (r) = Gconvert (r) – Initial Poverty Gap (r) × r.  
The upshot is that: higher capture-parameter translates into higher technological spillover; also, 
per capita income of recipients rise due to induced productivity escalation. This, in turn, translates into 
reduced income and productivity gap, which transforms into fall in poverty gap.  
4. Methodology, Framework, and Simulation Design for implementation 
 
 For our analysis of technology, trade and inequality, particular focus is given on the emerging 
economies India and China, as they comprise almost 33% of the population of the world. The headcount 
fraction of population in poverty ($2) is at 53.7% for China and 86.2% for India (Cline, 2004). We 
explore the possibility (or impossibility) of reduction in income poverty in these major economic 
heavyweights via trade with their major trading partner the US (i.e., developed North). Implications of 
policy reforms on reducing inequality and poverty are important for these two countries as they are 
important trade partners of the US. Scope of a hub-and-spoke three-player configurations between USA 
vis-à-vis India and China in global trade policy scenario is an important factor (a la Fugazza and Robert-
Nicoud 2006). We consider two generic types of shocks viz., [1] trade policy shocks related to trade 
                                                 
31
 This is motivated by the fact that we do not have data for (r) for GTAP composite regions. However, given the 
primary focus of our research this linear (instead of log-linear) specification suits our purpose to support our conjecture.  
The derivative, as in equation (15), is negative implying capture-parameters‘ dampening effect on the poverty gap. 
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liberalization episode under Hub-and-Spokes (HAS) vis-à-vis FTA between India and China, 
multilateral trade liberalization between USA and other regions, and [2] technology shocks related to 
TFP in high-technology sector in USA. 
4.1 Database 
 In the context of analysis of trade and poverty, use of such CGE models is also practiced—see 
Cline (2004), Hertel and Reimer (2004). However, in discussing the poverty impact of trade policy the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) literature on South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, or Bangladesh) and 
South East Asia is not so proliferating. That also motivates us to focus on emerging economic 
heavyweights, namely, India and China.
32
 Multi-regional, multi-sectoral CGE models score over other 
analytical tools for modeling global trade policy issues (Hertel 1997).Literatures abound with models 
that focuses on the trade policy issues especially in the context of Europe, North America, and South 
America (see Bhagwati 1993, Francois and Sheills 1994). Unlike, partial equilibrium models and Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) and Input-Output models, CGE approach is far more sophisticated in tracing 
the intersectoral and inter-regional linkages. It accounts for repercussions in other regions and sectors in 
response to an exogenous policy shock. In particular, Global Trade Analysis Project‘s (GTAP) Version 
6 global database and the modified CGE trade model is used for undertaking the research (Hertel ed. 
1997; Dimaranan and McDougall, 2003).
33
 A reduced dimension 1412 aggregation of the database is 
used for calibration. Choice of regional dimension is motivated by our primary emphasis on the trade-
growth-poverty nexus. We consider twelve commodity types. Each trading region engages in trade with 
other regions. High-technology products are supposedly intensive in sophisticated technology and trade 
in such products is a primary conduit for technological spillover across borders. Following Armington 
(1969) specification, products are differentiated by geographical regions of origin. Table 4 presents the 
regional and sectoral aggregations. Table 5 shows the sectoral composition. 
                                                 
32 As mentioned in sections 2 and 3 above, performance of India and China, despite idiosyncratic features, receives 
special attention in present study as they are most populous and emerging growth engines or giants. 
33
 GTAP 6 is the latest release of the database based solely on the beta release of Version 5.4 database. However, Version 
6 extends the beta release to more regions with same number of sectors and those regions are not subject of analysis in 
the present research and hence, it does not undermine our purpose. 
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Table 4 - Sectoral and Regional Aggregations used for the implementation 
Version 5.4 Sectors with Identifier Version 5.4 Regions with Identifier 
1. Pdr [Paddy, Rice] 1.USA [United States] 
2. Wht [Wheat] 2. CAN [Canada] 
3. Gro [Grains] 3. Ind [India] 
4. LMNFCS [Light manufacturing] 4. Chn [China] 
5. HMNFCS [Heavy manufacturing] 5. Jpn [Japan] 
6. HITECH [High Technology Products] 6. Sam [Latin American Countries] 
7. V_F [ Vegetable, Fruits, etc.] 7. MERCOSUR [Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay] 
8. Osd [Oilseeds] 8. Sea [South East Asia] 
9. Extract [Natural Resources] 9. Osa [Other South Asia] 
10. Food [Food and Agriculture] 10. Slk [Sri Lanka] 
11. TexClt [Textile and Clothing] 11. HTW [Hong Kong and Taiwan] 
12. SVC [Services and activities, NES] 12. Bgd [Bangladesh] 
 13. EUFTA [European Union] 
 14. Rest of the World [ROW] 
Source: Author‘s aggregation based on GTAP V5.4/6 database. 
Table 5- Sectoral Composition 
Sectoral Aggregation  GTAP Sectors  
Paddy  
Wheat 
Grains 
V_F 
OSD 
Food 
 
 
 
 
 
Extract  
 
TexClt 
Light manufactures  
 
High-tech manufactures  
Heavy manufactures  
 
 
 
Services  
Paddy rice,  
Wheat,  
Cereal grains nec,  
Vegetables, fruit, nuts,  
Oil seeds,  
Sugar cane, sugar beet, Plant-based fibers, Crops nec, Bovine cattle, sheep 
and goats, horses, Animal products, Raw milk Wool silk-worm cocoons, 
Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat prods, Meat products nec, 
Vegetable oils and fats, Dairy products, Processed rice, Sugar, Food 
products nec, Beverages and tobacco products  
  
Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals nec, Petroleum, coal products  
 
Textiles, Wearing apparel  
Leather products, Wood products, Paper products, publishing, 
 
Electronic equipment, Machinery and equipment nec, Manufactures nec  
Metal products, Motor vehicles and parts, Transport equipment nec,  
Chemical, rubber, plastic products, Mineral products nec, Ferrous metals, 
Metals nec  
 
Electricity, Gas manufacture, distribution, Water, Construction Trade, 
transport, Financial, business, recreational services, Public admin and 
defence, education, health, Dwellings & Svces  
Source: GTAP database and aggregations by author 
 
 The GEMPACK software suite developed at the Centre of Policy Studies, Monash University, 
Melbourne, Australia is used to conduct simulations (Harrison and Pearson 1996). 
4.2 Parameters Settings: 
In keeping with the theory, our augmented theoretical model incorporates four sets of 
parameters in addition to the standard GTAP model parameters. These are skill-induced AC index, 
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governance parameter GP, social acceptance parameter SA, and technological proximity parameter TC. 
For AC, we calculate the regional skill-unskilled labor payment shares and use those regional skill-
intensity ratios, as proxying AC. Calculation shows that r proxying ACUSA and ACHTW is the highest of 
all the regions. Calculated AC-values are such that ACUSA> ACHTW 
ACEUFTA>ACJAPAN>ACMERCOSUR>ACSAM>ACCAN>ACCHINA>ACINDIA>ACSOUTHASIA. However, for 
composite regions such as Hong Kong-Taiwan, South East Asia or South America the figures are high. 
Canada falls behind EU and Mercosur whereas intra-group differences are small and show similar 
intensity implying more or less similar pattern of skill-intensity. 
Regarding binary structural congruence parameter (SC), we consider two constituents: TC and 
GP. For GP, we use the World Bank's most recent and comprehensive data on six dimensional 
governance indicators (Kauffman et al. (2003) and Kauffman (2004)).
34
 These values at much 
disaggregated level are bounded between -2.5 and + 2.5. However, based on these disaggregated 
observations for each regional category, we construct a simple average, composite governance indicator 
for each GTAP region. Typically, as the six aspects are, 'by virtue of inherent commonality', interrelated, 
the indicators suit our purpose. Thus, composite indicator as simple arithmetic average of the estimates 
of score on each separate ones is a reasonable proxy for overall attribute of governance. Then, we 
transform via Equation (3) to find binary indexes of the concerned regions with unique source. We 
consider absolute magnitude of the indexes as we make relative scaling for binary comparison with 
respect to USA as the benchmark. The values are bounded between '0' (extremely low degree of 
governance) and unity (i.e., like the value for USA vis-à-vis Canada and EU with high-quality 
governance). Based on these findings, we infer that USA, EU, Japan and Canada are more 
institutionally homogeneous as opposed to low-income countries. However, for South Asia and East 
Asia, these values are not as low. In case of India and Sri Lanka as compared to Bangladesh and other 
South Asian countries, the magnitude of GP parameter is higher -0.65 and 0.69 respectively.
35
 In case of 
China, the value of this binary parameter is lower (0.32) compared to Hong Kong – Taiwan composite 
region (0.74). This is owing to the government's ineffectiveness in providing better institutional 
variables like property rights or governance. 
 The values of TAI measure are taken from Human Development Report (2001) and R&D 
figures are taken from Human Development Report (2003). For those regions where such values are 
missing, in conformity with the same pattern of values of R&D expenditure share in GNP, we proxy the 
                                                 
34
 These indicators for perceived institutional quality are: Voice and accountability, Political stability, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption. Although basic calculations and data sources 
are presented, the values of such parameters for AC, SA, TC and GP are not reported here for want of space. 
35
 By calculating the composite values of GP indices from its estimates of score of each of the 6 components, we get 
figures for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as more negative compared to that in India. This implies better governance in India 
compared to those South Asian nations. But, taking absolute magnitude gives erroneous perceptions about this parameter. 
To avoid this inconsistency, we make adjustments by calculating regional averages of 6 indices (6.49) and then, take the 
difference of each of the countries GP values to compute the relative difference/distance from regional average of South 
Asia. This gives consistent measure of GP values of South Asian nations.  
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share values of hi- and medium- technology exports as indicators of technological achievement. We get 
higher values for USA, Canada, Japan and EU whereas for the rest we get relatively lower or same 
magnitude within a group (via Equation (9)). For SA, we consider human development index (Human 
Development Report, 2003). We take East and South East Asia's composite human development index 
for threshold values.
36
The model is solved using customized windows program Gempack.
37
 We 
consider simultaneously generic types of shocks viz., technology shocks related to TFP augmentation in 
high-technology sector in USA and trade policy shocks under Hub and Spokes configuration.
 38
  
5. Scenarios and Results. 
5.1 Technology Spillover Scenario: Pure TFP Shock 
 In this scenario, we consider exogenous total factor productivity augmentation in the Hi-
technology sector in the USA that is transmitted to other regions.  Under such a scenario, pure 
productivity shock spills over to the other laggard regions. Among several empirical studies estimating 
TFP indexes across regions, relatively few provide industry specific TFP indexes. To the best of our 
knowledge, amongst the recent studies only Keller (1997, 1998, 2001) calculated a TFP index by 
industry for 8 OECD countries. We match Keller‘s (1998) ISIC [revision 2] sectors with the GSC1 
sectors in our current implementation. From the figures, it is evident that the industries included in the 
hi-tech and heavy manufacturing clusters experienced rapid technological change and hence, higher 
average annual TFP growth during 1970-91—around 3.4% is the average growth in such sectors. We 
consider hi-tech sector as the source of innovation. According to Keller (1997, 1998), the average 
annual growth in multifactor productivity in the composite hi-tech sector was 3.2% during 1970-1991. 
We use linear extrapolation method to extrapolate growth rates over 6 years encompassing the 
simulated period
39
. In particular, we shock the Hicks-Neutral technological coefficient in USA in hi-
tech sector by 4%. The closure is the standard GTAP macroeconomic closure (Hertel 1997). Two major 
spokes are India and China.   
 In this section, we consider macroeconomic repercussions. Because technological change is 
occurring in the manufacturing sectors, we confine our discussion mainly for hi-tech, heavy 
manufacturing and light manufacturing.  After the TFP improvement in hi-tech in the US and the 
associated endogenous TFP changes in all other sectors (both domestically and abroad), the economy-
                                                 
36
 The reason behind choosing East and South East Asia as borderline case of threshold level is that these regions, over 
last two decades have embarked on a path of human resource–led development path and achieved remarkably high 
growth cycles. This miracular performance sets them as a reference region (World Bank 1998/99). 
37
 This is developed by Ken R. Pearson and colleagues at the Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT, Monash University, 
Australia based on GEMPACK software suite. See Harrison and Pearson (1996) for GEMPACK simulation software. 
38
 We could consider trade reform scenarios with different configurations. However, given the focus that is not reported. 
39
 According to Keller (1997, 2001) the rate of growth of R&D stock in USA is 7.4% of which 90% is originating in 
manufacturing comprising hi-tech and heavy manufacturing. That is, the growth of R&D in manufactures especially in 
two sectors heavy manufacturing and hi-tech. is 0.90×7.4%= 6.4% (approximately). Simple average of the TFP indexes 
in these 2 sectors is also 3.2% 
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wide indexes of TFP register an improvement in all the regions. However, the magnitude of the index 
differs markedly across the regions (row 1, Table 6).  
 
Table 6- Simulated regional effects of 4% TFP shock in the Hi-tech sector in the US on selected 
macroeconomic variables (percent changes). 
Percentage change in: US Canada EU China South 
America 
India Mercosur Bangla- 
desh 
Sri  
Lanka 
1. Region-wide index of TFP
 
growth 3.6 2.2 0.76 0.11 1.65 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.16 
2. Real GDP at Factor Cost 3.6 2.2 0.76 0.11 1.65 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.16 
     Source: Simulations by the authors. 
US, being the source of innovation, experiences the highest overall technological progress compared to 
the regions experiencing a lower TFP improvement than the US; more importantly, amongst the 
recipients, Canada, EU and South America (including Mexico under NAFTA) receive higher doses of 
technology transmission than the other regions. Being neutral in nature, the TFP change translates into 
an equivalent increase in real GDP at factor cost in the regions. However, the discrepancies in TFP 
growth performances across regions can be attributed to differences in magnitudes of capture parameter 
and its constituents. The higher value of those parameters and hence, of the capture parameter ][ r  
magnifies value of the embodiment index; thus, enabling Canada, South America and EU to record a 
much higher rate of TFP improvement than other regions in South Asia and China. Higher volume of 
trade flows under NAFTA from USA inflates aggregate embodiment indexes in Canada and Mexico. 
Despite having higher r in Mercosur than South America, higher embodiment index and spillover 
coefficient in South America translate into relatively higher TFP and welfare gains there (Table 7).  
In case of India, China, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka the growth in TFP induced by spillover is of 
lower order of magnitude. This is owing to the fact that these countries, unlike those in NAFTA and 
EUFTA and Latin American regions, relatively speaking, do not have much trade with USA although 
liberal trade reform measures have been taking place in recent times. Moreover, due to lower values of 
trade-embodiment indexes the magnitude of spillover coefficient is much lower for these nations as 
compared to EU, Canada and South America. In addition, the values of the capture parameter are 
relatively lower in these countries compared to Japan, Canada, EU and Hong Kong, Taiwan. These 
lower values translate into lower regional TFP indexes for India, China and other South and East Asian 
regions in our model. Comparing the values we can infer that these regions are socio-institutionally 
much less congruent to the US and hence the transmitted benefits are not captured in its fullest potential 
as is found in case of more institutionally homogeneous regions like Canada or EU. Regarding post-
simulation trade scenario, aggregate volume of exports increases in the principal beneficiaries of TFP 
changes, while for USA, it increases slightly. Real value of Imports increase for all regions except India 
and Mercosur. Because the changes in price relativities across regions induce changes in regional terms-
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of-trade (TOT), the pattern of inter-regional competition is disturbed. The countries and regions (namely, 
Mercosur, China , India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) for which export prices have fallen more than the 
aggregate import prices, have been able to improve their trade balance. The next section gives 
comparative enumeration of combined simulated effects of trade liberalization scenarios. 
5.2 Analysis of Results for combinations of TFP shock and trade policy configurations:  
To offer a comparative enumeration of technology invention policy, we consider two generic 
types of trade liberalization scenarios in the presence of spillover: firstly, HAS configuration of trade 
reform where the Hub, USA liberalizes trade with spokes India and China simultaneously (non-
sequential) and subsequently, we simulate intra-spoke liberalization. In our case, we consider regional 
Sino-Indian free trade between India and China with technology transmission from USA to the spokes. 
That is, firstly two separate FTAs are simultaneously established: China-U.S. FTA and India-US FTA.  
Second, FTA between China and India: following the establishment of the HAS system, we simulate the 
implementation of the regional trade liberalization in which trade is liberalized between the spokes.
40
    
 In this scenario, we conjecture that China and India gain directly in HAS and FTA phase but 
other developing regions like Mercosur, South East Asia and Latin America gain indirectly in 
multilateral trade liberalization phase via USA vis-à-vis other economies—the reason being by 
simultaneously establishing FTA with the US, these regions get a head start directly. In the next phase 
of trade liberalization with FTA between India and China, Mercosur and other developing regions will 
be able to reap gains (indirectly) later out of this technology spillover from the US.41  In the presence of 
the TFP shock, we simulate a one-shot emergence of a HAS (i.e., USA simultaneously forms FTA with 
India and with China).  The results reported in Table 7 show that the TOT movement preserves the same 
ranking and order of magnitude except for China and USA who register relatively higher improvement 
in terms of trade due to preferential market access and resultant rise in trade. Thus, welfare increases 
considerably contributed by predominantly technical change (see rows 6 and 7 in Table 7). Also, China 
and India are able to register positive trade balance due to trade creation except Canada, and USA 
whose exportable become relatively dearer compared to the price of the importable. Following the 
establishment of the HAS, we look at the case in which a more comprehensive regional Indo-China 
FTA is achieved by freeing trade between the spokes.   
Table 7-  Simulated regional effects on aggregate performance without sequencing 
Regions USA China India South America Canada 
Type of configuration: Joint 
HAS 
 (1) 
Indo-China 
FTA  
(2) 
Joint 
HAS 
(1) 
Indo-
China 
FTA  
 (2) 
Joint 
HAS 
 (1) 
Indo-
China 
FTA  
 (2) 
Joint 
HAS 
 (1) 
Indo-
China 
FTA  
 (2) 
Joint 
HAS  
(1) 
Indo-
China 
FTA  
 (2) 
                                                 
40
  In particular, using the updated database from the previous experiment, we simulate trade liberalization between the 
spokes—India and China—to have full-fledged liberalization among the three players. 
41
 On the contrary, in a reverse sequence where at first China forms FTA with USA and then with India, the 
technological benefits will be harnessed by China at later stage only when USA liberalizes trade with her.  
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Changes in:  
1. Terms-of-trade 0.64 0.19 0.92 0.24 0.07 -0.27 -0.16 0.14 -0.32 0.15 
2. Aggregate export price 
index -1.06 -1.35 -0.79 -1.35 -1.56 -1.80 -1.62 -1.37 -1.66 -1.30 
3. Aggregate import price 
index -1.69 -1.54 -1.69 -1.59 -1.62 -1.53 -1.47 -1.50 -1.34 -1.45 
4. Regional Household 
Income 4.06 3.97 0.74 0.30 0.21 0.20 1.81 1.89 2.31 2.48 
5. Change in trade balance 
(in million US $) -44010.22 -38978.11 -374.9 2370.9 581.33 882.83 179.36 -327.09 -1011.20 -1246.50 
6. Welfare (EV) (in 
million US $) 293090.9 295569.9 5702.7 2322.3 773.62 721.39 13381.02 14032.1 13111.5 14199.4 
7. Contribution of TFP to 
EV(in million US $) 285401.7 292745.3 1000.1 1246.1 503.58 710.30 12267.8 12158.7 11923.47 11926.1 
Source: Authors' simulation of impact of 4% TFP Shock plus joint HAS and FTAA. Note: First 4 rows report results in 
Percentage changes. Welfare and trade balance changes in rows 5, 6 and 7 are reported in levels.  
 
In this FTA scenario, TOTs fall in India whereas other considered regions maintain the same 
sign. This is due to the fact that in the scenario, USA and Canada, the biggest benefactors of trade-
induced technology flows and having higher parameters of such capture, are able to appropriate the 
benefits of market accesses in these two regions. Although, export diversion occurs between two spokes, 
it is not substantial and the presence of technology transfer makes the welfare to improve.  However, 
under HAS and Sino-Indian intra-spoke liberalization scenarios the productivity mechanism and 
induced spillover reduces income inequality by small order of magnitude. These are in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8 Values of original (Base Case) and ex post (Post-Simulation) 
Gini Coefficients under HAS and Indo-China FTA Scenarios 
HAS FTA Indo-China
Regions Initial Gini Converted Gini Converted 
Gini Coefficient via Equation 13 via Equation 13
1. India 0.325 0.3249 0.3248
2.  US 0.408 0.405 0.405
3. CHN 0.447 0.4469 0.4468  
Comparing rows 1 and 3, Table 8 we see that relative to initial Gini coefficients, ex post Gini values 
decrease under both HAS and intra-spoke FTA  scenarios; also, as compared to HAS configurations, in 
Indo-China FTA scheme the fall in income inequality is a bit more. This is due to indirect spillover 
under full-fledged liberalization between India and China—two structurally and socio-institutionally 
more homogeneous Asian countries. Comparing India and China, we see that regional income and 
welfare changes are much higher in case of China. In case of South Asian bloc, India is ahead of Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh because of higher doses of spillover values from USA into India as compared to 
other countries in that region of neighborhood.  
 Thus, we now analyze the effect of such productivity benefits and associated factors for 
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income inequality as formalized above. When constellation of socio-institutional parameters like 
governance, social acceptance, human development and absorption capacity are optimal such that 
spillover coefficient and capture is higher, then, we see that Gini measure of inequality deflates from its 
original high value. Higher capture and resultant progress parameters in developed countries like USA, 
Canada, EU, and Japan translate into much reduced poverty gap from its initial endowment (compare 
columns in Table 9). In fact, in case of the source of technology creation, USA, the gap goes down 
considerably because of highest embodiment and technology capture.  
 However, the experiences differ across the recipients depending upon their variability in 
assimilation and capture of technology transmitted from the US. In less developed countries, the gap is 
reduced but much less than USA's richer trade-partners, viz., Japan, Canada, EUFTA, HTW. For India 
and China, it differs with relatively more gap reduction in case of former than the latter. Bangladesh and 
other South Asian nations lag behind India and China although they manage to reduce the gap a bit due 
to induced transmission benefits. Thus, comparative evaluation of regional performances exhibit that 
technology spillover with adequate capture is necessary for elimination of inequality and gap. In other 
words, the regions like India, China, South East Asia, Hong Kong, Mercosur have been able to reduce 
their original poverty gap and Gini coefficient owing to higher 'progress' and 'capture' of transmitted 
state-of-the-art from developed regions like USA, EU, Japan and Canada--either directly, or indirectly. 
Table 9- Values of Original and ex post Poverty Gap and Capture Parameters across Regions 
Regions Capture 
Parameter 
Aggregate 
Spillover 
Poverty Gap 
(Original) 
Poverty Gap 
(Ex post) 
Gini 
Converted 
US 0.71 0.82 0.31 -0.02 0.20 
Canada 0.32 0.51 0.31 0.06 0.16 
Japan 0.48 0.10 0.36 0.01 0.18 
EUFTA 0.47 0.18 0.31 0.01  
HTW 0.33 0.19 0.36 0.06 0.18 
India 0.03 0.02 0.72 0.14 0.16 
China 0.03 0.03 0.42 0.21 0.22 
South-East Asia 0.04 0.09 0.36 0.19 0.20 
Bangladesh 0.002 0.02 0.67 0.17 0.17 
Sri Lanka 0.05 0.04 0.67 0.18 0.21 
MERCOSUR 0.08 0.07 0.40 0.23 0.27 
South America 0.01 0.38 0.40 0.25 0.25 
 
 Now, the increase in income (row 4, Table 7) creates further gain via increase in gross 
investment and capital accumulation and hence, results in ‗trade-induced investment-led growth‘. In 
each case, compared to HAS sequences the FTAA scenario gives much augmentation of capital goods 
leading to efficiency gains. Thus, even in a static CGE framework quasi-dynamic effects are generated 
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owing primarily to trade-led technology spillover. Below Table 10 reports the sectoral performances 
behind such growth effect.  From the values of sectoral spillover coefficients (column 3, Table 10), it is 
evident that in USA sectoral TFP growth is highest in all three sectors as compared to other regions 
(column 4, Table 10). The highest value of capture parameter magnifies the values of spillovers there 
and hence resulted in higher TFP growth.  Similar considerations apply for Canada, EU and South 
America. However, for the relatively laggard regions China and India with lower magnitude of r, the 
resultant sectoral TFP growth is of very low magnitude (column 5, Table 10).  Cost-saving and 
consequential decline in supply prices is largely attributed to a decline in the price of composite value-
added and its constituents following TFP shock. However, compared to HAS sequences, in full-fledged 
FTA scenario India registers much larger fall in prices compared to China, due to direct and indirect 
transmitted productivity gains, thereby grabbing market access at the expense of China.  
 
Table 10- Simulated impact on sectoral TFP, output and spillover coefficient by sectors
*
 
Regions Sectors 
Spillover 
Coefficients 
(Base period) 
Sectoral TFP 
Growth 
(Percentage 
changes)   
Sectoral Output 
(Percentage 
changes)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
USA LMnfcs 0.91 3.65 3.45 
 HMnfcs 0.91 3.63 2.92 
 HiTech 0.88 4.00 2.48 
CAN LMnfcs 0.63 2.48 2.44 
 HMnfcs 0.59 2.34 2.23 
 HiTech 0.66 2.62 2.15 
China LMnfcs 0.02 0.10 0.95 
 HMnfcs 0.03 0.13 0.39 
 HiTech 0.04 0.22 0.25 
India LMnfcs 0.02 0.12 0.82 
 HMnfcs 0.02 0.12 0.13 
 HiTech 0.05 0.32 0.11 
South America LMnfcs 0.47 1.85 2.05 
 HMnfcs 0.48 1.90 1.74 
 HiTech 0.50 1.99 2.15 
Mercosur LMnfcs 0.04 0.16 0.68 
 HMnfcs 0.08 0.32 0.64 
 HiTech 0.14 0.56 0.43 
              *Figures in columns 4 and 5 are in percentage changes following TFP shock.  
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Insights   
 Of late, with the rise to prominence of endogenous growth theory the role of international 
trade and foreign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) in facilitating trans-border technology flows and 
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consequential rise in productivity has been of immense research interest. This paper addresses the effect 
of international trade and liberalized regime under trade policy configurations between USA and 
especially developing regions like India, South America, China, and other Asian nations on intra-
national and international disparities in income inequality. We consider the dynamism of the high 
technology clusters viz., ICT in inducing productivity escalation and economic growth. By simulating 
an augmented version of a global CGE model, we find considerable welfare gains in each recipient.  
 In particular, the paper models a mechanism of income inequality reduction and elimination of 
poverty gap facilitated by technology appropriation. Higher constellation of social acceptance, 
institutional congruence, and better institutional variables aid technology assimilation, thus, leading to 
inequality convergence. Thus, income inequality falls with trade flows, provided capture parameters and 
its constituents are appropriate to harness the opportunities let open via global trade. Reduction in 
income poverty leads to poverty alleviation. In our model, we find that incidence of fall in inequality 
with global trade openness needs to be aided by the associated factors such as better governance, human 
capital, human development, social acceptance and socio-institutional congruence with developed 
nation with high per capita income. Followings are the prospective policy insights from the analysis: 
a) Concomitant flows of technological benefits due to trade liberalization under FTA and role of 
technology policies help in achieving higher economic growth. In addition, government as well as 
private entrepreneurs effort for unleashing innovation potentials and promoting R&D efforts enable 
poverty reduction and economic development. In other words, government‘s role in designing and 
implementing appropriate domestic reforms by adopting a pragmatic approach is necessary for 
developing adaptive capacity. 
b) There are income distributional impacts and benefits especially the effects under different trade 
policy and technology policy. A balanced outcome of the public-private actors enable realizing the 
innovation  potential via promoting skill formation, education, quality institutions. 
c) Educational attainment and other socio-institutional parameters have prominent role in harnessing 
the productivity benefits and hence, in enhancing technology capture to reduce income inequality 
and poverty of relatively laggard trading nations. 
d) Public policy for promoting innovation and enabling factors like education, R&D, and good 
institutions is crucial for realizing potential growth and the Government‘s role is to prepare the 
ground as a ‗gardener‘ (World Bank 2010). Role of industrialization, innovation, trade as well as 
domestic policies are all instrumental for inclusive growth. Tale of two nations—China and 
India— offers valuable lessons of innovation for other laggard nations to grow.   
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